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Only twenty-five years ago the three Baltic States were impoverished republics of the USSR and the historical memories of the USSR, the KGB, and the gulags are all very fresh. Although the Baltics suffered greatly, the people of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were not crippled by their historical experience. The majority of the Baltic populations certainly have no liking for the Russians, but they coexist with them. Since independence, Baltic businesses are mainly focused on the West, but they still have considerable economic dealings with the Russians, especially in terms of importing energy and raw materials and serving as a transport conduit to Russia from the West. The Baltic populations coexist, generally very peaceably, with large Russian ethnic populations that are a legacy of the Russian population movements after World War II. Finally, the Baltic populations feel considerable security in belonging to NATO and the European Union, and their attitude towards the Russians remains realistic. They know they have to exist as small democratic states next to a very large third world (in most respects of living standards), aggressive and dictatorial neighbor.
English is now the common language of the Baltic young people, businessmen, and academics, but Russian is still widely understood and spoken among the over-forty generation who had to learn it in school from a young age. The Baltics follow the Russian media closely (when I lived in Tartu Estonia, one hour from Russia, I had twelve Russian channels on cable TV) and read Russian books. Many of the Baltic leaders travel to Moscow on business and high school students travel as tourists to nearby St. Petersburg. The Baltic States have world-class universities (Tartu University, Tallinn Technical University, University of Latvia in Riga, and the University of Vilnius etc. are exceptional modern universities with very high entry standards) with some of the top Russian studies faculties in Europe.
After more than five years of living in the Baltics and working with their governments I can say that the Baltic political leaders are highly realistic. They know that, in order to survive, small democratic nations like theirs that border a ruthless dictatorship need allies. The Baltic States' populations believe, for very good reason, that they face an existential threat from Russia, a nation that intensely resents the fall of the Soviet Empire and whose leaders are working to restore a new version of the Soviet Empire in which the Baltic States and all former republics will have a place clearly subordinate to Russian interests. This article will examine the view of Russia and the Putin government from the perspective of the Baltic States and focus on the key areas of friction between the Baltic States and Russia.
the WeIght of hIstory
History is key to understanding the Baltic and Russian relationship and the Baltic peoples' relationship with the West. First of all, while the Baltic States are geographically in Eastern Europe, in terms of culture, economic relationships, religion, and political development, they are thoroughly Western European. The Baltic relationship with the West began in the late twelfth century with the arrival of merchants, missionaries, and crusaders from Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. The Baltic region was inhabited by pagan tribes divided into two major ethnic/linguistic groups, the Baltic peoples (ancestors of the Latvians, Prussians and Lithuanians), and Finno-Ugric peoples (ancestors of the Finns and Estonians). By the 1240s Danish and German crusaders established small states and dioceses in Latvia and Estonia (Livonia) as the local tribes converted to Christianity (some voluntarily, some not). A German-speaking upper class, including assimilated local rulers, governed the small states. And the establishment of Hansa cities (Europe's first free trade organization), brought extensive Western European trade to the Baltics and Latvia, and Estonia became prosperous. Lithuania developed separately and remained Europe's last pagan kingdom until it accepted Catholic Christianity in 1386 and aligned itself by marriage to the Polish dynasty. Along with Finland, the Baltic region developed as an integral part of the West in the middle ages in terms of religion (Catholic, not Orthodox), political relationships (tied to the Swedish and Danish Kingdoms and German Empire), and economics, with the German language as the lingua franca of the Baltic States.
After the Teutonic Knights' state dissolved in the early sixteenth century, Estonia and Latvia became Lutheran under the Swedish Empire. In the eighteenth century, Czar Peter the Great conquered Estonia and Latvia and absorbed them into the Russian Empire. Later that century Lithuania was conquered by Russia and the Duchy of Kurland (Kurzeme in modern Latvia) was taken into the Russian Empire. However, under the Czars, the Baltic countries developed very differently from the rest of the Russian Empire. From the beginning of the Russian takeover, the provinces of Estonia and Latvia were granted autonomy under the Czar with a council of ethnic German barons ruling the region. When the Russians took Finland from Sweden in 1809, it was granted autonomy as a grand duchy and ruled by an indigenous nobility. Both Finland and Livonia, as Lutheran and culturally Western, looked to the West in terms of trade and culture. Estonia and Latvia became the richest and most advanced provinces of the Russian Empire with universal literacy in the region by 1800 (150 years before Russia had universal literacy), and with serfdom abolished more than 40 years before Russia. Lithuania remembered its long history as an independent state and duchy associated with Poland and, along with the Poles, initiated several major nationalist rebellions in the nineteenth century. These were, of course, suppressed with utter ruthlessness by the Russians, but failed to quench the desire for independence. Under self-rule, Estonia and Latvia developed more peacefully, and by the nineteenth century the Baltic provinces and Finland had an indigenous middle class, extensive trade with the West, and was the first region of the Russian Empire to industrialize.
However, through the era of the Russian Empire, there was constant friction between the Baltic peoples and the Russians caused mainly by the prosperity of the Baltic peoples vis-a-vis the generally poorer Russians and the very important role that the Baltic nobility played in running the empire. One only has to read War and Peace to see the friction between the ethnic Russians and the Baltics. The commander of the Russian army in 1812 was Marshal Barclay de Tolly, an ethnic German from Estonia with a staff of mostly German speaking officers who were viewed by the ethnic Russian officers with distrust as "Germans," and as such were not fully committed to the preservation of Russia.
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Latvia and Estonia, along with Finland, became the most modern, literate, and advanced regions of the Old Russian Empire. In the nineteenth century the Baltic peoples developed a strong sense of nationalism. The Baltics retained their languages and national culture as separate from the Russian culture and created sophisticated national literatures. With the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917, the three Baltic States and Finland quickly established Western-style governments and, with Western help (German and British help mostly), decisively defeated the Red Army in a series of bloody independence wars.
3 Russia, soon to become the Soviet Union, reluctantly accepted reality and recognized the three Baltic States and Finland as independent nations. However, the Soviets remained bitter and hostile towards the Baltic republics and the interwar period saw some blatant acts of aggression against the Baltic countries that included a failed attempt by Soviet agents to overthrow the Estonian government by a coup during Christmas 1924.
In the twenty years of peace following the end of the independence wars, the three Baltic nations evolved as modern Western countries with some measure of prosperity, in contrast to the violence, collectivization, and poverty prevalent in Russia under Stalin. However, in August 1939, the fate of the small republics was sealed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided Europe into spheres of influence to be controlled by Stalin and Hitler. The three Baltic States were designated as a Soviet sphere of influence, along with Eastern Poland, part of Romania, and Finland. The Soviet Union was given the green light by Hitler to annex those regions. Stalin immediately invaded Finland in November 1939, and after a brief and bloody war succeeded in annexing a large major part of Finnish territory. At the same time Stalin pressured the Baltic States into allowing large Soviet military bases in their countries. The West, at war with Hitler and fearful of antagonizing Hitler's key ally, did nothing to counter this naked aggression against small democratic states. In June 1940, the neutral and militarily weak Baltic States were invaded and occupied by Stalin's forces. The Baltic governments were dissolved, the national leaders arrested and murdered, and after phony elections, the three nations were annexed as part of the Soviet Union and became republics of the Soviet Union.
the BaltIcs as Western natIons
In the summer of 1940, after phony elections, the three nations were annexed and became republics of the Soviet Union. 5 Under Soviet domination, the three Baltic States suffered horrendous oppression as the national elites were either murdered or sent to the gulags. Collectivization of farms and nationalization of industries and businesses were imposed. Large sectors of the population that included priests and ministers, businessmen, many professionals, intellectuals, military officers, and landowners were identified for mass arrests and deportations.
6 The only respite came from the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 that quickly overran the Baltic States and placed the countries under German control until 1944. The Baltic peoples, who had long resented German rulers and who had kicked the Germans out in 1919, viewed the Germans as the lesser of two evils and a considerable number of Latvians and Estonians fought alongside the Germans during the World War. 7 The fact that the Baltics had fought eagerly, and very well, against the Soviet State remains one of the main points of friction between the Baltic States and Russia today.
After the Soviets reestablished power in the three Baltic States in 1944, there were massive waves of repression lasting until the death of Stalin in 1953. 8 This period was characterized by imprisonment or forced exile of hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians either to the gulags or Siberia. 9 The Baltic peoples strongly resisted and large nationalist resistance movements were formed in the Baltic States. For almost a decade after the end of World War II, the Soviets faced anticommunist guerrilla forces, called the "Forest Brothers," in the rural areas of the Baltic States. Not until 1953, after major efforts by the KGB and military, were the Forest Brothers effectively suppressed. 10 Repressing the Baltics was a bloody conflict that lasted for years and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties. The waves of Soviet repression in the 1940s and 1950s touched virtually every family in the Baltic States. Most Baltic families can recall a father who was jailed, an uncle who disappeared in the gulags or a grandfather sent to Siberia. The memories are still fresh.
While repression became less brutal after Stalin's death in 1953, the rest of the Soviet era was still a grey dictatorship maintained by a harsh criminal code that punished any expression of dissent and was backed up by the ever-present KGB. The Baltic States became a center for Soviet high-tech and military industries and thousands of Russian workers were brought into Latvia and Estonia to work in the military complexes. The northeastern corner of Estonia was declared an area of military industry and cleared of Estonians, who were deported and replaced by Russians. Large numbers of Russians were also settled to work in industries in Latvia. Lithuania was the only Baltic nation that did not experience a large influx of Russians because the Forest Brothers caused so much trouble in rural areas that Stalin's plan to settle Russians on collectivized land were foiled.
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In the era after Stalin death in 1953 to the 1980s, Soviet policy was to Russify the Baltic republics and Sovietize the national culture. On the surface the Baltics were "good Soviet citizens," but under the surface the Baltic people worked to preserve their language, literature and unique national identities. It was an impressive effort of peoples who never forgot their history or identity as independent nations. For examples, throughout the Baltic States monuments to Baltic victories over the Red Army in 1919-1920 were carefully hidden in houses and barns or buried in fields, only to reappear in the 1990s after more than fifty years of Soviet rule. The American policy of never recognizing the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States as legitimate served as a beacon of hope to the Baltic peoples. The Helsinki Accords (1975) also put international pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce the persecution of dissidents. With the difference in freedoms and standards of living between East and West so glaring, even the Soviet leaders could not maintain the façade of communist success. In the late 1980s, when Premier Gorbachev announced reforms in the Soviet Union, the Baltic peoples responded by organizing non-communist political parties (quite illegal even under Gorbachev) and initiating mass demonstrations opposing Soviet rule. The most dramatic expression of Baltic nationalism and yearning for democracy came in August 1989 when, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, more than two million Baltic citizens formed a human chain several hundred kilometers long through the three states. The chain began in Tallinn, Estonia, wound through Riga, Latvia, and ended in Vilnius, Lithuania. On that day the Baltic peoples celebrated their national pride and thousands flew their secretly-made national flags, even though it was a criminal act by Soviet law. It was the largest peaceful mass demonstration in history. Whatever the local communist leaders had told Moscow, the Baltic human chain was clear proof that most Baltic peoples saw the Soviet Union as an occupying force.
The desire for the Baltic peoples to have an honest account of their relationship with the USSR resulted in the Soviet government agreeing in 1989 to a commission of Baltic and Russian historians to examine the events of 1939 and 1940. The joint commission acknowledged the existence of the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and in December 1989, the People's Congress of the USSR voted to denounce the secret Soviet/Nazi protocols as unjustified and invalid under international law.
12 This resolution completely undercut any legal or moral foundation for the Soviet Union to retain the Baltic States as subject republics, and the independence movement in the Baltic States progressed to open calls for the renewal of their independence.
In defiance of the USSR, Lithuania declared its independence in 1990, and held free elections as KGB troops tried to suppress the new government in Vilnius in January 1991. Bloody repression attempts in Latvia and displays by Soviet forces in Estonia were met with overwhelming public mobilization against the Soviet government. In the Baltic nations, militia units were formed and deployed to guard newly elected national parliaments, town councils, and other democratic institutions. Free elections were held and resulted in democratic and anti-communist governments. National referenda in all three countries overwhelmingly supported full independence. With the failed coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States all officially proclaimed independence and were soon recognized by the Western nations.
the BaltIc states opt for the West
The reform government in Moscow under Boris Yeltsin that followed the 1991 coup recognized the Baltic States as independent nations, and for a brief period the Russians and Baltic States tried to establish friendly state-to-state relations. The chief priority for the new Baltic democracies was to negotiate the withdrawal of all the Russian military bases in the three Baltic States, of which there were many. The complex negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian forces and the turnover of bases to the national governments in 1994.
In 1997, Russia attempted to negotiate a long-term arrangement with the Baltic States that offered security guarantees and economic ties to Russia in an attempt to keep the Baltic States neutral and far away from NATO. Given the unhappy history of past Russian guarantees the Russian proposals were rejected out of hand and this resulted in considerable diplomatic and economic friction between Russia and the newly independent states. 13 Yet, from the Baltic viewpoint, Russia had nothing positive to offer. In the 1990s, Russia was broke and suffering from economic and social crisis, and openly developing into an authoritarian mafia state run by oligarchs. The idea of relying on the security and protection from a government that had recently killed unarmed Baltic citizens in the independence demonstrations of 1990 and 1991 was ludicrous. The Baltic States saw nothing from the old Soviet system worth retaining, and the only thing that the new Russian Federation could offer was cheap energy. So when the Baltic States regained independence, they immediately chose a path of Westernization of politics, economics and defense, and this approach was overwhelmingly supported by the people. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania adopted democratic constitutions and parliamentary states, all opted for capitalist market economies with laws on the model of the U.S. and Western Europe, and they created new armed forces from scratch, all on a Western/Nordic model and equipped with Western weapons and Western doctrine.
What the Russian Federation offered the Baltics in the 1990s was nothing less than maintaining an illusion of a lost empire, and this had no appeal to the Baltics. That the Baltic policy of turning to the Western model of government and economics was a wise one is evident in the dramatic economic and social progress made after the fall of the Soviet Empire. Countries that decided in 1991 to move to a fully Western model (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the three Baltic States), have become stable and prosperous. Countries that were unwilling to take the plunge towards full democratization and Western economics, and retained a close association with Russia, remain mired in authoritarianism and poverty. Starting from a relatively equal level of per capita income in 1991, Eastern European and Baltic States have since enjoyed high economic growth rates and made rapid progress towards a Western European living standard while Russia-aligned nations continue to lag in every standard. One can simply compare the World Bank data (2013) on per capita income (Gross National Income -GNI) to see that. The GNI for Poland was $12,960, Estonia $17,370, Latvia $15,280, and Lithuania $14,900. Contrast this with the GNI for Russia's close ally Belarus ($6,720) and the Ukraine ($3960), a country that only last year began the move to Westernize. Even oil rich Russia lagged behind the three Baltic States with a GNI of $13,860.
The desire to rejoin the West was not a rejection of their history, but a fulfillment of it, as the Baltic States see themselves as fundamentally Western in national culture. Still, with Russia on their borders, the Baltics proceeded cautiously in the area of national security policy. The Baltic States maintained an official policy of neutrality until the withdrawal of the last Russian forces from the Baltic nations in 1994. At that time all three nations proclaimed their goal of complete political and economic integration with the West and announced their intention to join the NATO alliance as soon as possible. 14 16 The competence of the Baltic forces in Afghanistan won praise and respect from Coalition allies and demonstrated that the Baltic States were willing to pay a price in blood to demonstrate the depth of their commitment to the West. In the history promoted by the Russian government under Putin, the official view is that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States was fully justified and those Baltic claims of Soviet crimes against humanity, which are carefully documented and detailed by national commissions in the Baltic States, are exaggerated. The Russian historical approach under Putin is to portray the Baltic peoples as enthusiastic Nazi supporters in World War II, and any critique of the Soviet Union and its role in the Baltics is a "revival of fascism." 18 In 2014, Putin stated that an "open neoNazism" has become "commonplace" in Latvia and the Baltic states as well as the Ukraine. 19 History is now a major battlefield between Russia and the West. Beginning in 1988, all three Baltic States created historical commissions composed of top academics to document the extent of human rights abuses in the years of Soviet occupation. One helpful circumstance was the rapid abandonment of regional headquarters of the KGB in the Baltics and the large amounts of files left behind. Since the 1990s, the Baltic governments have published extensive historical studies carefully documenting Soviet-era arrests, mass deportations and mass murder in the Baltic States. Baltic attempts to publish accurate histories and to gain international recognition of the crimes committed against the Baltic peoples have been challenged by Russian propaganda aiming to discredit the Baltic States internationally. 21 The attack on the legal existence of the Baltic States as independent countries has even accelerated. In 2015, the office of the Russian Attorney General issued a decision that the United Russian government that had recognized the Baltic States as independent nations was, in fact, an unconstitutional body and, therefore, the recognition of Baltic independence was illegal and invalid. 22 Since 2007, the Putin government has worked incessantly to rehabilitate Stalin and his actions. Russian history books have been systematically rewritten to minimize the crimes of Stalin and the Soviet regime and to extol the accomplishments of Stalin. 23 In 2009, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev set up a commission to combat "falsification of history"-which means any account that shows the Soviet regime in a negative light. 24 This fits with the new Russian history that now presents Stalin in a positive light as a great national leader and military commander. Putin's new education minister, Olga Vasilyeva, has stated publicly that Stalin was a "blessing for the state" and staunchly argues that Stalin's repressions and the Gulag state were all necessary actions to protect Russia. 25 This goes along with a wave of official historical revisionism that whitewashes the labor camp system and mass executions under Stalin and insists that events such as the Ukrainian Famine were the exaggerated product of Western propaganda. 26 A constant theme of official Russian media is to depict the Baltic peoples of the 1930s and 1940s as "Nazis" and insist that the Baltic peoples remain deeply "Nazi" today, thus legitimizing overt Russian hostility in the past and present. Western support for the Baltic States can therefore be interpreted as open support for the return of Nazism. For example, a Russian News Service denunciation of a film about the Latvians in World War II states, "One wonders if the filmmakers stressed the fact that ethnic Latvians were amongst the most enthusiastic and willing collaborators with the Nazis during World War II . . . The U.S. government is supporting Nazi revisionists in Riga (and in Tallinn, Kiev, and Zagreb as well). How low have we fallen?" 27 Russian media cartoons of 2014 show depictions of Latvia with a Hitler and Nazi flag and the Russian state media runs articles such as "Estonia could become a haven for Nazis around the World." 28 The characterization of all Eastern Europeans, and especially the Baltics, as Nazis is a regular theme stressed by Putin. In October 2014, in reply to Putin's campaign, the Latvian Foreign Ministry commented that that Putin was waging an "information war" against the Baltics and other European states.
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Putin's feelings on the interpretation of history are not a new development. In 1994, long before he came to power, at a meeting in Hamburg, the Estonian President Lennart Meri referred to the Russians as "occupiers" and Putin dramatically stood up and led the Russian diplomats out of the conference. 30 Russia's policy to style itself as the protector of ethnic Russians outside of Russia, is one of the major themes in the books of Project Russia, the ideological expression of the Putin regime. 31 Today, the state-supported Russian media publishes books insisting that the occupation of Lithuania under Stalin was a voluntary act endorsed by Lithuanians, and that the occupation of Lithuania in 1940 and after World War II was legal and proper. These blatant falsifications of historical events that included mass murder and deportations are clearly irritating to the Lithuanian and Baltic peoples. But the Baltic governments also understand that the actions by Russia are essentially part of a long-term information campaign to delegitimize the Baltic States in the eyes of the world, to whip up the feelings of the ethnic Russian population in the Baltic States against the Baltic governments, and to encourage the belief among the Russian population that the Baltic States are an imminent threat to Russia. Finally, the Putin regime's media campaign pushed the view that the Baltic threat can only be properly resolved if the Baltics come under the Russian sphere of influence as a subject state-something on the status of Belarus.
Today, Russia generously subsidizes ethnic Russian groups and political parties and local Russian television programs within the Baltic States. Russian regime propaganda is prominent in all three Baltic States, where it is seen by the Russian minorities who often refuse to assimilate as Baltic citizens. Information warfare, conducted over the long term, is a Russian specialty and many of the old Soviet propagandists are now working in the service of the Russian state. Indeed, the old Soviet media and propaganda organizations simply changed their names and operate today much like in the Soviet era-down to many of the old Soviet propaganda themes. These include an emphasis of Russian glory in World War II and labeling all who opposed the Soviet Union as fascists and Nazis. Russia has carried out media campaigns against Georgia, Moldova and Lithuania in times when Russia wanted to coerce those countries to accept Russian policies. 32 The non-Russians are fully aware of the content of the Russian programming and press as Baltic people over the age of forty generally speak fluent Russian. 35 Although ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia can become full citizens by a simple naturalization process that requires only a five-year legal residency and a basic knowledge of the national language, many ethnic Russians still refuse to take up citizenship. 36 The role of history plays a big role in ethnic tensions as the Baltic governments, representing the feelings of the great majority of their populations, have taken down or moved communist era memorials that represent the most horrible events of their history. For the Russian ethnic minority, however, the memorials to the Red Army and its occupation of the Baltic States are a reminder of the glory days of Soviet history. In 2007, the Estonian government's attempt to move a memorial to the Red Army in Tallinn provoked a violent response from mobs of ethnic Russians. Both Tallinn and the heavily Russian northeast region witnessed days of violent demonstrations and violence that resulted in one death. 37 In Latvia and Estonia there have been other incidents of mob violence connected with the Russian minorities. Lithuania is peaceful in this regard with only six per cent of its population ethnic Russian. However, the role of interpreting history also plays a very important role in the Lithuanian relationship with Russia, and there is considerable bitterness as well between Russian and Lithuanians over the period of Soviet occupation. 38 Unfortunately, several Russian opinion polls show that Putin's propaganda portraying the Baltic States as a threat to Russia is succeeding among the Russian population. Latvia and Lithuania are seen as two of the three nations most hostile to Russia in Russian polls. For example, the 2007 polls showed that 42% of Russians saw Lithuania as "very hostile" to Russia. 39 On the other hand, Putin is likely to be fooling himself if he believes that the ethnic Russian populations in the Baltic States might actively serve to help Russian ambitions to neutralize or reoccupy the Baltic States. While ethnic Russians in Estonia or Latvia might take pride in Putin, and voice support for the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, few would choose to live in Russia or to see their present situation changed. After all, the ethnic Russians of the Baltic States enjoy a far higher living standard than they would in Russia, far better social services and benefits, full political freedom, and better pay and opportunity than one finds in an economically-depressed, authoritarian Russia. Finally, their status as EU residents allows them complete freedom of movement in the EU and to foreign countries. Over time, the ethnic tension in the Baltics will diminish with the aging of the large Russian work force that was brought into Latvia and Estonia in the Soviet era and the ongoing assimilation of their children, who, unlike their parents, learn the national languages and are more integrated into the social and economic life of the country.
securIty concerns
All three Baltic States have faced aggressive and coercive actions from Russia in the last decade. In April and May of 2007, Estonia faced a large scale, highly organized cyber-attack that was designed to take down the government websites and the websites and communications of the banks and large businesses. This coordinated attack was most likely the work of Russian groups, although the Russian government denied any involvement. 41 The Baltics also face aggressive economic pressure from Russia. Lithuania, almost completely dependent on Russian energy supplies, pays the highest energy costs in the European Union. What is most disconcerting is the ratcheting up of open hostility against the Baltic States expressed in the highest levels of Russian leadership. In 2013, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Deputy Speaker of the Russian Federation State Duma, stated, "Let the puppies (referring to Latvia) bark in the world, eventually they will be occupied . . . The entire Baltics will be either occupied or destroyed . . . definitely."
42 Alexandr Dugan, Professor at the University of Moscow and a leading ideologue of the Russian regime, referred to the Baltic States in a recent interview and noted, "Russia considers them an enemy, and makes no special distinctions between them. This view is shared by the elite, including the liberals, and general population. Russia is waiting for a global redistribution of power (in the world). For example, should something happen to the U.S., we will immediately re-occupy these countries. We will accomplish this either peacefully or by force. We have already applied some of the methods to create serious internal problems in Estonia and Latvia." 43 The aggressive Russian statements against the Baltics are being followed up by various legal harrassment actions. In 2014, the Russian State Prosecutor, a major tool of Russian policy today as it was under Stalin, reopened the case against more than 1,500 Lithuanians who refused to serve in the Soviet Army after Lithuania declared independence in March 1990. The ruling, acting as if the Soviet occupation of Lithuania was legal, means that warrants have been issued against the Lithuanians who refused service. The Lithuanian government has advised those Lithuanians not to travel outside thr EU or NATO countries. 44 The Baltic States' responses have been restrained to such open threats to their independence, partly because they are members of NATO and the EU, and partly because they know that in their position as small countries that it might be best to refrain from criticizing the Americans or Western Europeans until it really matters. Unlike the American government or Western European governments, the Eastern Europeans and the Baltic countries realize that there was never any "reset" with Russia. 45 In fact, after the Obama administration announced that relations with Russia had been "reset" in 2009, the Baltic security situation became worse. While the U.S. and NATO talked of closer cooperation with Russia from 2009 to 2014, and NATO refrained from listing Russia as a threat, the last four Russian military doctrines promulgated since 2003 (the last approved in 2014), all explicitly state that NATO is Russia's enemy. Russian doctrine states that the expansion of NATO into the Baltic States constitutes a grave threat to Russia. 46 Yet within the European Union and in some major NATO nations there is a reluctance to challenge Russian aggressive actions in any meaningful way. Generally, the three Baltic States have refrained from speaking up in the NATO and EU councils in fear of upsetting the larger Western European nations, notably Germany, who are still committed to a closer relationship to Russia. Within the European Union the three Baltic States want to be viewed as modern and cooperative nations, and for this reason have been muted in pushing the EU to stronger actions against Russia since this would lead to increased friction with Germany, which is also a key Baltic trading partner. 47 There is an almost universal consensus among the Baltic political and military leaders that Russia is a direct threat to their existence and that, as small nations, the only sure assurance of their freedom is the defense guarantee of the U.S. through NATO. On the other hand, there has been a fear of sounding alarmist and thus irritating the U.S. administration by any overt critique of U.S. policy, or lack of policy, towards Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. 48 Therefore, the Baltic States have quietly worked through NATO to lobby for a more realistic view of Putin's Russia. In the run-up to NATO's publication of the new NATO strategic concept in 2009 and 2010, the three Baltic States, along with the Eastern European NATO members, mounted a quiet but effective lobbying effort to influence the new NATO Strategic concept. This lobbying effort worked to see that NATO officially recognized the strategic threat of Russia and would maintain its focus on conventional military deterrence. 49 In the NATO Strategic Concept document adopted by the member states at the Lisbon Conference, NATO reaffirmed territorial defense of the member states as a core mission of NATO. However, the focus of the Obama administration away from Europe, coupled with major U.S. force reductions in Europe in the face of major Russian military increases from 2009 to 2014 left the Baltic nations very worried about the long-term commitment of America. The Russian annexation of the Crimea and the open use of force to support Eastern Ukrainian insurgents who want to bring the Eastern Ukraine under Russian control finally killed the hopes of a reset and forced the Western states to take action against Russia in the form of economic sanctions.
After failing to find a diplomatic solution to the Russian aggression in the Ukraine, and reluctantly recognizing that Russia poses a military threat to NATO's eastern members, in 2016 NATO responded to the re-quest of the three Baltic States and Poland for a permanent NATO military force in the region by stationing three to four thousand NATO troops (including 1,000 U.S. troops) in the Baltics and Poland on a rotating basis as well as stepping up NATO's air and naval presence in the Baltic Sea region. This action was supported by the U.S. specifically to serve as a deterrent to Russia's increase of military forces in the region. 50 The new U.S. administration under President Trump has signaled support for the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. Although Trump was highly critical of NATO and the failure of most member states to meet NATO's goal of 2% of GDP for defense, after his election he changed his position. Meeting with NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in April 2017 Trump praised the alliance and stated that it was not obsolete. 51 Despite hopes of improving relations with Russia, the increase of NATO military forces in the Baltic region is continuing. 
